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1. INTRODUCTION
As the United States seeks to maintain its edge in an
increasingly competitive and integrated world economy,
biotechnology has become one of its most promising
industries.' While there may be a consensus that the U.S.
biotechnology industry has a great potential for profit and
expansion,' the industry (still in its infancy)' is plagued with
problems. For instance, it is difficult to apply existing patent
laws to this technology, and this phenomenon has threatened
even the most promising companies in the industry.4 Fears
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See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 19 (1991) [hereinafter OTA-
BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT] (asserting that by many measures the United
States is a preeminent force in biotechnology).
' See Ronald E. Yates, Biotechnology Blossoms But Rivals Gaining on
U.S., CHI. TRIB., Oct. 4, 1992, at C1 (noting that biotechnology is the "child
prodigy" of the business world); JOHN NAISBITr & PATRICIA ABURDENE,
MEGATRENDS 2000: TEN NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE 1990'S 262 (1990)
(stating the United States is a world leader in terms of biotechnology
investment and sales).
3 See NAISBITT & ABURDENE, supra note 2, at 242-43 (providing an
overview of the rapidly changing biotechnology industry and the
implications for future technological developments).
' For example, patent litigation caused tremendous fiscal loss to Genetics
Institute, resulting in a fall in its stock price and the sale of a 60% stake in
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abound that the biotechnology industry may go the route of the
semiconductor industry5 unless measures are taken to close
existing loopholes in domestic and international patent laws.
Such fears motivated the Bush Administration's refusal to
sign the Convention on Biological Diversity ("Biodiversity
Treaty") at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.'
Biotechnology trade organizations, such as the Association of
Biotechnology Companies, applauded the U.S. refusal to sign
the Biodiversity Treaty.' These organizations objected to
provisions of the Biodiversity Treaty that advocate a transfer
and sharing of technology and profits with the developing
nations that provide the raw materials that are essential to
the biotechnology industry.' These provisions are aimed at
ensuring these developing nations a share in the social and
economic profits of biotechnological development and
innovation.
This Comment will argue that the absence of a U.S.
biotechnology policy resulted in the initial refusal of the
United States to sign the Biodiversity Treaty. Now that the
United States has signed the Biodiversity Treaty, however,9
the company to American Home Products. See Ronald Rosenberg, Biotech
Firm Split on Choice of New Backer, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 10, 1992, at 45.
' The Office of Technology Assessment once noted that "America
invented the videocassette recorder, [of which semiconductors and
microprocessors are key components,] but now only sells 2% of them."
Karen Tumulty, Global Competition: Can U.S. Still Play By Its Rules?, L.A.
TIMES, June 8, 1992, at A8. There is evidence, however, that the U.S.
semiconductor industry has made a comeback. See, e.g., The Rising Sun in
the West, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 20, 1994, at 72 (noting the Japanese
perception that the U.S. semiconductor industry is again competitive). The
fear is that by the year 2000, Japan and the European nations will surpass
the United States in developing products based on U.S. innovations in
biotechnology, in the same way these nations once surpassed the United
States in the development of products based on U.S. semiconductors.
Tumulty, supra, at A8; see also Merrill Goozner, Global Patents Pending,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 13, 1992, at N1 (noting the problems of filing patents
internationally and how the biotechnology industry may face patent wars
similar to those faced by the U.S. semiconductor/microprocessor industries,
unless measure are taken).
' See Biodiversity Treaty Risks Interfering with Patent Protection,
Official Says, [Jan.-June) Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1071-72 (June
15, 1992) [hereinafter BNA-Patent Protection].
7 Id. at 1072.
ild
SSee William K. Stevens, Gore Promises U.S. Leadership on Sustainable
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it must aid the U.S. biotechnology industry by closing existing
loopholes in both domestic and international patent laws.
Such changes will encourage agreements between the
developing nations that supply raw materials and U.S.
biotechnology companies that stand to earn millions of dollars
through commercially viable biotechnology products that use
these materials.
Section 2 of this Comment will address the developing
biotechnology industry, the profit potential of the industry
through the globalization and commercialization of
biotechnology-pharmaceutical products, and the potential loss
of U.S. competitiveness to Europe and Japan. Section 3 will
examine the concerns of the biotechnology industry regarding
U.S. patent laws. Section 4 will discuss the role of developing
nations in the biotechnology industry as well as U.S. objections
to provisions of the Biodiversity Treaty concerning patent
protections and the contributions of developing nations.
Section 5 concludes that the U.S. biotechnology industry would
be better served if the United States develops a comprehensive
biotechnology policy that protects and promotes the U.S.
biotechnology industry, in part by eliminating existing patent
loopholes. Such a policy should also provide benefits to the
developing nations that supply materials and resources for the
development and commercialization of biotechnology products.
2. OVERVIEW OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
2.1. Biotechnology's Profit Potential
Biotechnology is defined as "any technique that uses living
organisms or substances from those organisms to make or
modify a product, to improve plants or animals, or to develop
micro-organisms for specific uses."" Aided by computer
hardware and software and innovative bioprocessing
techniques," biotechnology is developing and expanding at a
Development Path, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1993, at C4; see also Elliot
Diringer, U.S. Suddenly a Leader on World Environment, S.F. CHRON., June
14, 1993, at Al (noting President Clinton's agreement to sign the
Biodiversity Treaty after President Bush had rejected it).
'0 See OTA-BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 1, at 268 app. F.
" See NAISBITT & ABURDENE, supra note 2, at 242 (noting that computer
systems are used in biotechnology to "unlock the secrets of life").
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rapid pace. One study reports that the United States remains
preeminent in this industry, with the government spending
more than $3.4 billion in 1990 alone to support research and
development ("R&D") in biotechnology."2 Private industry in
the United States has invested over $2 billion in companies
that were established slightly over twenty years ago.'"
Numbering over one thousand,'4  these dedicated
biotechnology companies - ("DBCs")'5  are considered a
"uniquely American phenomenon." 6 DBCs have the potential
to earn $100 billion per year in sales by the year 2000.17
Such projections undoubtedly account for the fact that Japan
and Europe have chosen to target biotechnology as an industry
of the future.'"
Biotechnology, currently a U.S.-dominated industry, is
becoming increasingly global as large Japanese and European
companies clamor for their stake in the industry by acquiring,
merging with, or investing in smaller DBCs.'9 Because of
their size, scarce financial resources, and the high cost of
litigation ° arising out of patent disputes with other small
companies, DBCs welcome and require a high infusion of
12 See OTA-BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.
13 See COMMITTEE ON JAPAN NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, U.S.-JAPAN
TECHNOLOGY LINKAGES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: CHALLENGES FOR THE 1990S 1-2
(1992) [hereinafter U.S.-JAPAN TECHNOLOGY LINKAGES] (the $2 billion dollar
figure is for fiscal year 1990).
14 Id. at 6 n.8.
1" DBCs are companies devoted solely to biotechnology R&D.
16 OTA-BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 1, at 19. The U.S.
biotechnology industry consists mostly of small DBCs, whereas in Japan
major corporations involved in other businesses account for the majority'of
companies involved in biotechnology. See U.S.-JAPAN TECHNOLOGY
LINKAGES, supra note 13, at 6-7 and n.8.
17 See Yates, supra note 2, at C14.
18 See id. at C1 (noting possible advances France, Britain, and Japan will
have made in this area by the year 2000); see also Gale Eisenstodt, A
Different Kind of Drug Problem, FORBES, Jan. 22, 1990, at 40 (noting that
Japan has targeted biotechnology as a focus area for its economy); cf. Robert
T. Yuan, The Biotechnology Potential, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Aug. 15,
1988, at 8 (noting that Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan have also
targeted biotechnology as a priority area for industrial development).
'9 See THOMAS C. WIEGELE, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 72 (1991). Such firms usually are "large-scale enterprises or
multinational corporations with significant resources to engage in research
and the marketing of the products of biotechnology." Id.
20 See infra notes 80-107 and accompanying text.
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capital-capital that private industry and Wall Street seem
willing to supply.2 1 The U.S. biotechnology industry raised
$3 billion in public equity in 1991, and another $2 billion in
public equity financing in the first half of 1992.22
The U.S. biotechnology industry, and some market
analysts, fear that the United States may lose its competitive
edge in biotechnology. Some commentators speculate that
biotechnology has been sold too cheaply.2" Others assert that
unless steps are taken to protect biotechnology through patent
law modifications,24  the United States will lose its
competitive edge to Japan by the year 2000, and subsequently
to Europe, especially where European nations have made
significant progress in biotechnology development and
commercialization.25
21 See generally OTA-BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 1, at 45-68
(giving an overview of the financing process, strategic alliances, and tax
gains of U.S. biotechnology companies).
2 See Yates, supra note 2, at C14. Such activity led former U.S.
Senator, now Vice President, Al Gore to proclaim that biotechnology is the
"selling of the tree of knowledge to Wall Street." Senator Al Gore, Planning
A New Biotechnology Policy, 5 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 19, 22 (1991).
23 See U.S.-JAPAN TECHNOLOGY LINKAGES, supra note 13, at 3.
24 See Carlos A. Fisher, Comment, Unfair Trade Practices in
Biotechnology: The Legacy of In Re Durden, 21 Sw. U. L. Rev. 1103, 1105
(1992) (noting the loopholes in processing patent claims); John C. Herman,
Case Comment, Biotechnology and Recently Amended Section 337: Federal
Circuit Grants No Protection, Amgen, Inc. v. United States International
Trade Commission, 902 F.2d 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1990), 24 VAND. J. TRANSNATL
L. 827, 841 (1991) (noting the judicial and legislative loopholes in the
interpretations of patent law); Brandi L. Wickline, Note, The Impact of the
Deposit Requirement for Patenting Biotechnology: Present Concerns,
Proposed Solutions, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 793, 822 (1991) (noting that
legal flaws still leave microbiological inventors vulnerable).
25 See Carol E. Curtis, Rx: Made in Japan, Forbes, Aug. 17, 1981, at 37
("First television sets, cameras and steel. Then autos and computers. Now
those tough competitors from across the Pacific are aiming at the drug
industry."); Eisenstodt, supra note 18, at 40 (stating that Japanese firms are
tapping U.S. pharmaceutical knowledge); Goozner, supra note 5; at N1
(noting that Japanese firms "dominate lists of leading patent-winning
firms"); Tumulty, supra note 5, at Al, A8 (asserting that the Japanese and
German governments' integration with and sponsoring of private industry
puts these countries in a better position to compete on a global level); Yates,
supra note 2, at C1 (noting that France and Britain are making significant
gains against the U.S. biotechnology industry).
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2.2. Biotechnology Globalization And Commercialization
The economic, legal, and social impact of biotechnology is
most evident in the alliance that has formed between the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. Biotechnology-
pharmaceutical sales2" alone are expected to reach $60 billion
by the end of the decade. 21 Over a dozen biotechnology-
pharmaceutical drugs have entered the commercial market,
and an estimated 130 more are on their way.28 Amgen, Inc.,
of Thousands Oaks, California, is clearly a leader among
DBCs. Sales of Amgen's drug, Epogen ("EPO" or
'Erythropoietin"), which treats anemia in end-stage renal
disease patients, totaled over $200 million during EPO's first
full year of sales in 1990.29 Sales of EPO in 1991 were
expected to reach $1 billion.30 Other promising biotechnology
drugs, including treatment for the side effects of
chemotherapy,3  growth deficiencies in children,32  acute
myocardial infarction (heart attacks),3 and for AIDS-related
anemia,34  have entered the market.. The enormous
possibilities and potential profits 5 are attractive to both
foreign and domestic transnational drug manufacturers.
Some DBCs,36 such as Centocor,37 continue to exist on
26 The United States claims a surplus of exports over imports in
pharmaceutical products. See Milt Freudenheim, Though Markets Vary,
Drugs Work Anywhere, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1992, at L49.
27 Promises, Promises, Promises, ECONOMIST, Oct. 5, 1991, at 69.
2 8 See OTA-BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 1, at 7; Promises,
Promises, Promises, supra note 27, at 69.
29 See U.S.-JAPAN TECHNOLOGY LINKAGES, supra note 13, at 6.
3 See Promises, Promises, Promises, supra note 27, at 69.
3' Neupogen, manufactured by Amgen, Inc., Thousand Oaks, California.
PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE 605 (47th ed. 1993).
32 Protropin, manufactured by Genentech, San Francisco, California.
PHYSICIAN'S COMPENDIUM OF DRUG THERAPY 1993 at 15:18.3 Activase, manufactured by Genentech, San Francisco, California. Id.
at 9:67.
"4 Procrit, manufactured by Ortho Biotech, Raritan, New Jersey. Id. at
9:86.
3 r See U.S.-JAPAN TECHNOLOGY LINKAGES, supra note 13, at 2 (asserting
that "[the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries have been rated as
second only to the computer software and services sector in terms of total
value creation among U.S. high-technology companies founded since 1965").
36 The top 10 U.S. biotechnology firms in R&D spending in 1990 were:
Genentech; Amgen, Inc.; Genetics Institute; Cetus; Chiron; Centocor;
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their own without the infusion of capital from larger
pharmaceutical, companies. A majority of DBCs, however,
have opted through mergers, acquisitions, licensing, or various
other agreements, to seek the assistance of larger
pharmaceutical companies."8 These alliances are beneficial
for both parties. Larger pharmaceutical companies provide
newly-formed biotechnology companies with much needed
capital for R&D."9 The established companies also have
existing global sales forces, providing immediate access to the
commercial market once a drug has been approved for sale. In
return, DBCs supply major pharmaceutical companies with
innovative techniques and products offering a vast potential
for profit. In 1990, alliances with biotechnology companies
accounted for fifty-five percent of the 304 strategic alliances
formed by transnational drug companies.4"
The larger U.S., European, and Japanese pharmaceutical
companies form various types of alliances with smaller DBCs.
U.S. and European companies usually opt for acquiring a
majority share in a biotechnology company or entering into
licensing/financing agreements. The larger company supplies
the capital for the R&D, and the biotechnology company agrees
to share any profits from the commercial marketing of a
successful drug.41 Sometimes the larger companies will
Biogen; Xoma; Immunex; and Genzyme. I& at 15. Cetus has since merged
with Chiron. See Emma Chynoweth, Cetus Sells Diagnostics to Roche,
Merges With Chiron, CHEMICAL WK., July 31, 1991, at 12; Joan Hamilton,
Revenge of the Nerds in Biotech Land, Bus. WK., Aug. 5, 1991, at 26.
37 See OTA-BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 1, at 84-85.
38 See WIEGELE, supra note 19, at 92; see also infra notes 47, 49-53 and
accompanying text. Based on overall sales, the top pharmaceutical
companies in 1989 were: Merck & Co. (U.S.); Glaxo (U.K.); Bristol-Myers
Squibb (U.S.); Bayer (Germany); Hoechst (Germany); Eastman Kodak (U.S.);
Ciba-Geigy (Switzerland); SmithKline Beecham (U.S./U.K.); Sandoz
(Switzerland); and American Home Products (U.S.). These companies have
global operations, conducting research and manufacturing throughout the
world. See OTA-BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 1, at 85.
" It can take anywhere from five to ten years of R&D before a
biotechnology product reaches the market. See U.S.-JAPAN TECHNOLOGY
LINKAGES, supra note 18, at 6 n.7. Estimates of the amount of capital
required to fund R&D varies depending upon the outcomes of experiments,
which makes estimating necessary capital quite difficult for these smaller
companies.
40 Promises, Promises, Promises, supra note 27, at 69.
41 See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
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simply purchase a particular technology for their sole use and
subsequent development.4" Japanese pharmaceutical
companies also acquire biotechnology companies and enter into
licensing and sales agreements, but their primary mode of
staking a claim in the industry is usually through funding
universities" and private research institutions located
throughout the United States.
The Japanese method of investing in U.S.-based
biotechnology R&D has raised many concerns.4 These
linkages are viewed as creating a flow of information out of the
United States into Japan, without a corresponding influx of
technology from Japan. This phenomenon results in a
strengthening of the Japanese market and a weakening of the
U.S. ability to compete with, and commercialize, this
technology. 5 Linkages between Japanese firms and U.S.
academic and other research institutions include: Daiichi
Pharmaceutical's $1.2 million endowment of a chair at
Vanderbilt University; Shiseido's establishment of an $85
million dermatology research center at Massachusetts General
Hospital ("MGH"); Japan Research and Development
Corporation's grant of $15 million (over five years) to Michigan
State University for research on the evolution of microbes for
environmental biotechnology; and Yamanouchi
Pharmaceutical's collaboration with Mt. Sinai Medical Center
to develop a transgenic mouse exhibiting Alzheimer's
disease.'"
While such R&D arrangements are utilized primarily by
Japanese corporations, other foreign corporations have also
utilized these methods. For example, Hoechst, A.G., a major
42 For example, Cetus, a U.S. biotechnology company, sold its polymerase
chain reaction diagnostics technology, which can aid in producing a test for
the early detection of the HIV virus, to German-based Hoffman-LaRoche for
$300 million. See Chynoweth, supra note 36, at 12.
"' University funding may be in the form of general funding for
university research centers and departments and/or providing substantial
endowments for biotechnology R&D chairs. See infra note 46 and
accompanying text.
44 See U.S.-JAPAN TECHNOLOGY LINKAGES, supra note 13, at 52 (viewing
such linkages as disadvantageous to U.S. interests).
4SId.
4 6 Id- at app. B (Examples of Linkages Between Japanese Companies and
U.S. Academic Research Institutions).
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German pharmaceutical corporation, entered into a ten-year
agreement with MGH where Hoechst would invest $50 million
for R&D in return for "exclusive licenses to use any
[forthcoming] patents .... ."
Acquisitions, mergers, and licensing agreements between
foreign and U.S. biotechnology companies"8 within the past
four years have included: Swiss-based Roche Holding Ltd.'s
("Roche") acquisition of a sixty percent share in Genentech,
Inc.; 9 Sanofi's (France) acquisition of Genetic Systems
Corp.;-, the former West Germany's Schering AG's
acquisition of Triton Biosciences Inc.;5  and Japan's Chugai
Pharmaceuticals Inc.'s ("Chugai") acquisition of Gen-Probe,
Inc.52
Of the above transactions, Roche's acquisition of
Genentech, Inc.53 raised the greatest concern about the
selling of U.S. technology to foreign companies. Roche quieted
these concerns by pointing to its significant U.S. operations
and the presence of its wholly-owned subsidiary, Hoffman-
LaRoche, in Nutley, New Jersey.5  Roche also assured
investors that Genentech would continue to be independently
operated.55  Foreign acquisitions, agreements, and
arrangements with U.S. biotechnology companies are regarded
by some commentators as violating U.S. economic interests.5"
One commentator suggests that the United States should
"export products, not processes or knowledge."57
47 WIEGELE, supra note 19, at 77.
4' From 1989 to 1990, there were at least 38 such mergers and
acquisitions. See OTA-BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 1, at 55.
', See Andrew Pollack, U.S. Biotechnology Leader to Sell Swiss 60%
Stake, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1990, at Al.
50 See Polly Lane, Seattle Biotechnology Company Sold, SEATTLE TIMES,
Apr. 20, 1990, at D10.
" See Sabin Russell, Germany's Schering to Buy Triton: Sale Marks
Another Foreign Acquisition of a Biotech Firm, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 21, 1990,
at Cl.
2 Id. Chugai acquired Gen-Probe to establish a U.S. presence. Id.
s' Genentech was the first U.S. biotechnology company established to
take commercial advantage of new developments in biotechnology. See
Gore, supra note 22, at 21.
14 See Pollack, supra note 49, at Al.
5 See Promises, Promises, Promises, supra note 27, at 70.
66 See U.S.-JAPAN TECHNOLOGY LINKAGES, supra note 13, at 51.
67 See WIEGELE, supra note 19, at 78 (warning that "the United States
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The biotechnology industry's rate of expansion, its
international scope, the financial complexities inherent in the
industry, and present transfers of biotechnology have created
anxiety over the globalization and commercialization of the
U.S. biotechnology industry. Many commentators assert that
one way the United States can maintain a competitive edge is
to focus on strengthening domestic and international patent
laws.58 If it did so, the United States would be protected
from biotechnology being exported internationally and
manufactured into other products for later sale in the United
States.5"
3. U.S. PATENT LOOPHOLES
AND THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
U.S. patent laws provide protection for inventions and
innovations and "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.""0 It was not until 1980, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that organisms could be
patented.6 The organisms involved in Chakrabarty were
genetically-engineered bacteria capable of digesting oil.62
This decision was pivotal in the commercialization of
is in danger of becoming a knowledge colony for the world"). Some
commentators have expressed concern over whether university-industry
partnerships will hinder universities from maintaining their position as
independent bodies of research and information, and whether such
partnerships will impede a "wide exchange of information... between the
university and society." Gore, supra note 22, at 27. Gore also argues that
the extent to which public institutions are subsidizing private ventures
ought to be examined. Id.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
5 The United States is the world's largest market for pharmaceutical
sales. See U.S.-JAPAN TECHNOLOGY LINKAGES, supra note 13, at 27.
e U.S. patent laws are enacted under art. I, § 8, cl. 8 of the U.S.
Constitution.
" "Congress intended statutory subject matter to 'include anything under
the sun made by man.'" Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)
(quoting S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952); H. REP. No. 1923,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952)).
2 This organism has since been used in the clean-up of the Exxon Valdez
oil spill. See Bill Kaczor, Use of Oil-Eating Bacteria on Spills is Successful
But Short of A Cure-All, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1990, at B4; John Lancaster,
Oil-Eating Microbes Tested on Spill; EPA Calls Results in Valdez
'Promising,' WASH. POST, July 8, 1989, at A3.
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biotechnology."3
Patent protection is vital to the biotechnology industry,
particularly because small biotechnology companies invest
large sums of money in R&D. It can take anywhere from five
to ten years to research and develop a product before that
product enters the commercial market.64 Patent laws usually
provide protection for seventeen years.6 5 If a product takes
ten years to reach the market, the patentee has only seven
years in which to recoup gains from sales of a commercially
viable product. As a result, the patentee may not recover all
of the capital expended to develop, produce, and market the
product."6
3.1. The Deposit Requirement And Section 271(e)(1)
Before a patent may be issued, U.S. patent laws require
full disclosure of the "manner and process of making [an
invention]" in a context sufficient to enable others to make use
of this information.6" For biotechnology, usually the
organism itself is the novel invention to be patented.
Therefore, descriptions of recombinant DNA processes, or cell
fusion and resulting by-products, and other techniques of
genetic engineering may not suffice to give a clear
understanding of the "manner and process" of arriving at the
result. Hence, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO")
requires6 8 the patent application to include a deposit of the
6 3 See OTA-BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 1, at 214.
4 Amgen's EPO drug took six years from development to marketing. See
U.S.-JAPAN TECHNOLOGY LINKAGES, supra note 13, at 6.
6 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
" The U.S. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984 provides patent term extensions for pharmaceuticals meeting certain
criteria. See Gary Lee, House Favors Patent Extensions for 3 Firms, WASH.
POST, Aug. 5, 1992, at A21 (reporting that the U.S. House of
Representatives voted to extend patents on fat substitute food additives and
anti-inflammatory drugs). Japan has a similar act and the European
Commission is considering proposed legislation that would allow for
extension of pharmaceutical patents. See OTA-BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT,
supra note 1, at 93, Box 5-I.
6' This is the "enabling requirement" of U.S. patent law. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (1988).
" While not formally requiring it, the PTO strongly suggests compliance
with the deposit requirement. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical
Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that " '[tjhe deposit
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organism. 9
The PTO may deny the patent if a deposit is not made.
The PTO, however, will accept a patentee's written argument
and oral interview regarding whether or not the invention (i.e.,
the organism) requires a deposit.7 ° Patent validity and
claims of infringement may depend upon whether the patentee
complied with the deposit requirement.
By drawing a distinction between known aid unknown
sources of genetic material, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has attempted to clarify the question of
whether a deposit of genetically-engineered subject matter is
required. If the biological material is unknown and "obtained
from nature," others cannot replicate the invention without
having access to the organism." In such cases, a deposit of
the organism is required. 2 On the other hand, if the
organism is created by inserting genetic material into
"generally [known and] available sources," no deposit is
required." A description of how to replicate the invention
will suffice. 4
Once an organism is deposited, third parties can have
access to the culture for a minimum fee. 5 The patentee no
longer has physical control over her invention, and the self-
replicating nature of the organism provides third parties with
the "capability of producing an unlimited supply of the
organism." e
requirement is a nonstatutory mechanism for ensuring compliance with the
enabling provision under 35 U.S.C. § 112.' ") (quoting Hampar, Patenting of
Recombinant DNA Technology: The Deposit Requirement, 67 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Socy 569, 607 (1985)).
69 The United States currently has three internationally-recognized
depositories to collect and house organisms. The three U.S. depositories
recognized under the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of
the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure are:
American Type Culture Collection (Maryland); Northern Regional Research
Laboratory (Illinois); and InVitro International, Inc. (Maryland). See OTA-
BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 1, at 208.
"0 See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d at 1211.
71 See id.
72 See id.
7 See id.
'4 See id.
75 See OTA-BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 1, at 222.
76 Wickline, supra note 24, at 807; see also Fisher, supra note 24, at 1111
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Since there is no protection of the deposited samples, a
debate has surfaced over the domestic and international use of
the samples once they have been deposited.7 Under U.S.
patent law, a research exemption s provides third parties
with an experimental-use defense against a patentee's claim
of infringement. A third party need only assert that she is
conducting experiments with the organism for strictly
scientific purposes that do not infringe upon the rights of the
patentee to qualify for the research exemption.
The experimental-use defense is a court-created
doctrine." In 1984, in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co.,"0 the Federal Circuit held that the use
of a patented drug during the term of the patent for testing
purposes related to FDA drug approval constituted
infringement." Thus, the experimental-use defense was no
longer a viable defense to claims of infringement. The U.S.
Congress responded to Roche Products by amending the patent
(suggesting that since it is the actual organism that is patented,
"unauthorized propagation of a patented []organism may itself constitute
infringement of the patent").
" See Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit
of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure, Apr. 28, 1977, 32
U.S.T. 1241 [hereinafter Budapest Treaty]. The Budapest Treaty provides
for internationally recognized depositories where a patentee who is applying
for a patent in more than one country can make a single deposit of the
microorganism which will fulfill the deposit requirement under each
country's patent laws. The treaty does not address the use of deposited
samples. Therefore, the patent office of a signatory country can request, or
authorize third parties to request, a sample of the deposited microorganism,
and the substantive law of that country will govern the use of the sample.
The fact that so many parties have access to these samples led to the debate
over whether or not adequate protection against infringement exists for a
patentee's deposited "invention." See id. at 1258; see also Wickline, supra
note 24, at 804. Wickline suggests that acts of patent infringement can be
curtailed if countries afforded greater protection to patentees by allowing
the patentee to restrict access to its deposited samples. See id. at 823-25.
7 8 See OTA-BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 1, at 222-23.
" The experimental-use defense against a patentee's claim of
infringement originated in Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.
Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600). Whittemore held that an act of infringement does
not exist where a party merely experiments with a patented invention
absent an intent to use the patented invention for profit. Id.
so 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
" See id at 865 (stating that courts will no longer fashion an
experimental-use defense where Congress has not expressly provided for
this exception under U.S. patent law).
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law to add section 271(e)(1).2 The language of
section 271(e)(1) is specific to the biotechnology industry.8 3
Indeed, section 271(e)(1) has caused much concern about a
biotechnology patentee's rights to his inventions under the
patent laws. The Supreme Court has interpreted
section 271(e)(1) as "allow[ing] competitors, prior to the
expiration of a patent, to engage in otherwise infringing
activities necessary to obtain regulatory approval""4 through
a U.S. government agency such as the FDA. Courts remain
divided8 3 on the activities permissible under section 271(e)(1),
a fact which offers no assurance to small biotechnology
companies that they necessarily will be able to reap the
benefits of a product they have spent years developing. 8
3.2. Section 1337 Of The Tariff Act Of 1930 And The Durden
Dilemma
Section 1337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 makes it unlawful to
import into the United States articles that are made or
82 Section 271(e)(1) provides:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, or sell a
patented invention (... which is primarily manufactured using
recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or
other processes involving site specific genetic manipulation
techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs ....
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
83 See id.
84 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 671 (1990).
85 See id. at 661. This case did not specifically address the infringement
of a drug patent. The Supreme Court, however, utilized section 271(e)(1) and
held that experimentation with the patented invention for the purpose of
producing a cardiac defribillator was not an act of infringement against the
original patentee. But see Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v.
Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991). This litigation involved a
biotechnology-produced substance known as human Factor VIII:C-a blood
clotting drug used by hemophiliacs. Scripps had the initial patent and
Genentech was conducting experiments with the patented material as the
patent neared its expiration in order to produce its own version of the drug.
The court found such activities to be an impermissible act of infringement.
Thus, the section 271(e)(1) experimental-use exception would not apply. See
id. at 1583-84.
" See Cetus Wins Patent Fight, CHEMICAL. WK., Mar. 13, 1991, at 52.
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produced from a process covered by a U.S. patent."7 In In re
Durden, s the Federal Circuit held that an obvious process is
not patentable even if the "material" employed and the
resultant product are "novel and non-obvious."" Under
Durden, no patent should be issued for an obvious process.
U.S. patent examiners frequently deny process patents on this
basis. 0 Durden, combined with section 1337, results in the
"Durden Dilemma." The Durden Dilemma means that a
patentee may obtain a patent for a new organism, yet be
denied a patent for the process of making the organism. Thus,
a patentee would have no claim of infringement when a
company outside of the United States uses an unpatented
process, but imports back into the United States products
made with a patented organism. The perils of the Durden
Dilemma are illustrated by a series of cases involving Amgen,
Inc. and Genetics Institute ("GI"). "9
In 1987, both Amgen and GI were granted different patents
87 Section 1337 provides:
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the following are unlawful, and when
found by the Commission to exist shall be dealt with... as provided in
this section:
(B) The importation into the United States ... or the sale
within the United States after importation by the owner ... of articles
that...
(ii) are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or by means of, a
process covered by the claims of a valid and enforceable United States
patent.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1988) (codifying amendments under the Trade
Act of 1988) (emphasis added).
88 763 F.2d 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
89 See id. Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, obviousness is a question of law. See
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1207 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
" See OTA-BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 1, at 221.
91 See Fisher, supra note 24, at 1111-12. This series of cases, involving
patent infringement and the drug EPO, commenced with Amgen, Inc. v.
United States Intl Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1990) and
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
It continued when Ortho Pharmaceuticals sued both Amgen and Chugai/GI
for infringement of an EPO licensing agreement. See Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp. v. Genetics Institute, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 894 (D. Mass. 1992) (holding
that Ortho lacked standing to sue both GI and Amgen because Ortho's
licensing agreement with Amgen covered the sale of EPO in Europe, not in
the United States).
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for EPO.92 EPO is best described as a "biotechnology-made
copy of a human protein that circulates in the bloodstream and
triggers production of red blood cells."93  EPO is used
primarily for treating anemia in end-stage renal disease
patients. 4 GI licensed its technology to a U.S. joint venture
between Upjohn Co. and Chugai.95 Chugai began importing
back into the United States, for sale, the EPO drug it
manufactured abroad using Amgen's patented genes and host
cells.
In 1988, Amgen filed a complaint with the U.S.
International Trade Commission ("USITC") against GI and
Chugai96 for infringement of Amgen's EPO patent under
section 1337. The USITC ruled that Chugai's process for EPO
production did not infringe upon Amgen's patent, and,
therefore, no violation of section 1337 had occurred. InAmgen,
Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n ("Amgen I"),"7 the
Federal Circuit upheld the USITC's finding that Amgen could
not bar importation of goods made outside of the United States
that used a product patented in the United States if no U.S.
process patent existed. The court held that not only must the
organism itself be patented, but the process of creating the
organism must also be patented before a violation can be found
to exist under section 1337.98 Therefore, according to the
9' Both companies arrived at the same result through different methods.
An Amgen scientist isolated the EPO-producing gene, and by splicing it with
hamster cells, was able to produce EPO. Amgen patented the gene and host
cell that begins the EPO biotechnology process. GI's patent covered
producing EPO through urine. Later, GI was able to manufacture the drug
using biotechnology and licensed it to Chugai Pharmaceutical of Japan. See
Barry Stavro, Amgen Prevails in Patent Fight Over Its Anemia Drug, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at D1. This drug is estimated to have sales of over $1
billion per year. See Promises, Promises, Promises, supra note 27, at 69.
g Stavro, supra note 92, at D1.
g See id. Patients with kidney disease are "chronically" anemic due to
an inability to produce enough red blood cells. EPO is a biotechnology copy
of the human protein that triggers production of the red blood cells, thus
restoring the patient's lost energy.
95 See id. at D9.
" Amgen had established a joint venture with Kirin Brewery Co. of
Japan to market EPO, and GI had a similar agreement with Chugai. See
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Genetics Institute, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 894,
897 (D. Mass. 1992); see also supra note 86.
97 902 F.2d 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
9" There is pending legislation to correct this loophole, but some people
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court, both Amgen and Chugai possessed valid EPO patents.
Even if Amgen filed for a process patent concurrently with
its application for a product patent, however, it is conceivable
that the PTO may have denied Amgen a patent for its process
of producing EPO. In subsequent litigation, Amgen argued
that by using its patented genes and host cells, EPO could be
obtained by a "'routine limited dilution cloning procedure[]'
well known in the art." " An expert testified that the process
was "standard." These assertions may be interpreted to mean
that the process was "obvious." Thus, Amgen I illustrates the
problem of the Durden Dilemma: under Durden, Amgen likely
would not have been able to obtain a patent for its "obvious"
process, but at the same time, Amgen could not prevail in a
section 1337 claim against GI, because Amgen did not hold a
process patent.
Amgen, unable to win its battle over EPO under
section 1337, subsequently chose an alternative route to
invalidate Chugai's patent. Since GI had licensed its EPO
patent to Chugai, Amgen sued GI directly, alleging
infringement of its product patent. Amgen argued that its
patent covered GI's biotechnology version of EPO because GI
and Chugai were utilizing Amgen's patented host cell and
genes. In December 1989, a district court judge ruled that
both patents were valid."° Amgen appealed, and in Amgen,
Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. ("Amgen IT%'),1 the
Federal Circuit upheld Amgen's EPO patent and invalidated
GI's patent. °2
After the court's ruling inAmgen II, GI employed renowned
U.S. lawyer Lawrence Tribe to represent GI before the
Supreme Court.' The Supreme Court, however, refused to
hear GI's appeal.' On the day the Supreme Court denied
question whether the proposed legislation will correct this problem. See
Herman, supra note 24, at 843-44.
"Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1211 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (alteration in original).
100 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical, Co., No. 87-2617Y, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16110 (D. Mass. Jan. 30, 1990).
10 927 F.2d at 1200.
102 See id.
103 See Stavro, supra note 92, at D9.
104 Genetics Institute, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991).
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GI's appeal, Amgen's stock rose and GIs stock declined. 0 5
Subsequently, GI sold sixty percent of its shares to American
Home Products Corporation, with the president of GI
acknowledging that "[tihe outcome of the lawsuit was a
complete surprise to us and is one of major
disappointment.""'
The patent loopholes embodied in section 271(e)(1) and
section 1337 lead to costly, although necessary, litigation
within the biotechnology industry. Companies fear their
inventions are not adequately protected and realize that if
legal action is not taken to secure patent rights, the results
can be catastrophic, particularly for newly-formed companies.
Because the viability of biotechnology companies hinges, in
part, upon patent protection, and given the high costs of
patent litigation, in 1992 the Bush Administration refused to
sign the Biodiversity Treaty because the treaty contains
provisions that lessen the already scarce protection of patented
biotechnology.'
4. THE BIODIVERSITY TREATY
The Biodiversity Treaty was first presented to the
international community at the Earth Summit in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil, in June 1992.10" The Biodiversity Treaty is
designed to "stem the loss of animal and plant species,"'
but, in addition, contains provisions which have been
interpreted as advocating payment of royalties to developing
nations if commercially viable products are produced from
plants or other organisms found in that nation.
10
The Biodiversity Treaty calls for establishing and
maintaining efforts to preserve the estimated ten million
plants, animals, and other organisms found in the tropical
forests of developing nations."' These organisms supply the
105 See Stavro, supra note 92, at D9.
10 See Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 47.
10*7 See BNA-Patent Protection, supra note 6, at 1072.
108 See id.
109 See Alex Barnum, Taking Stock In The Rain Forest, S.F. CHRON., Dec.
22, 1992, at C1.
110 See Third World Seeks a Share of Biotech Profits, 24 NAT'L J. 1830
(1992).
" See Reid G. Adler, Biotechnology Development and Transfer.
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raw materials for biotechnology R&D." 2  Although the
United States may be regarded as the competitive leader in
the biotechnology industry,' the United States nevertheless
has been characterized as a gene-poor nation,"4 and should,
therefore, recognize the strategic importance of preserving,
maintaining, and obtaining access to these raw materials."
5
The plant material alone represents a value to the
pharmaceutical industry of "five to forty billion dollars
annually.""8 Countries that attended the Earth Summit
and actually signed the Biodiversity Treaty in 1992 recognized
the vast profit-potential of these materials." 7
4.1. U.S. Objections To The Biodiversity Treaty
The Bush Administration cited articles 16(3) and 19(2), two
provisions of the Biodiversity Treaty regarding the transfer
and sharing of patented biotechnology, as the primary reason
for the U.S. refusal to sign the Biodiversity Treaty. These two
articles provide the following:
Article 16(3): Each Contracting Party shall take
legislative, administrative or policy measures, as
appropriate, with the aim that Contracting Parties, in
particular those that are developing countries, which
provide genetic resources are provided access to and
transfer of technology which makes use of those
resources, on mutually agreed terms, including tech-
nology protected by patents and other intellectual
Recommendations for an Integrated Policy, 11 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH.
L.J. 469, 471 (1985).
112 Id. at 471-72.
11 See, e.g., OTA-BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 1, at 3; U.S.-
JAPAN TECHNOLOGY LINKAGES, supra note 13, at 1.
114 See Adler, supra note 111, at 472.
"r Id.
.. Id. at 476; see also id. at 473-74 (emphasizing the importance to
biotechnology of the "gene library" in the developing nations' natural
resources).
"" See BNA-Patent Protection, supra note 6, at 1072 (noting that during
final negotiations on the proposed Biodiversity Treaty, the Europeans
wanted to proceed despite the patent language contained in the draft); see
also Graeme Browning, Biodiversity Battle, 24 NAT'L J. 1827 (1992) (noting
that 114 countries, including Japan and various European countries,
initially signed the Biodiversity Treaty).
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property rights ... ,118
Article 19(2): Each Contracting Party shall take all
practicable measures to promote and advance priority
access on a fair and equitable basis by Contracting
Parties, especially developing countries, to the results
and benefits arising from biotechnologies based upon
genetic resources provided by those Contracting Parties.
Such access shall be on mutually agreed terms."'
The Association of Biotechnology Companies'
announcement that the provisions would lead to a loss of
patent protection for the biotechnology industry mirrored the
U.S. objections to these provisions. 20 U.S. concerns about
these provisions of the Biodiversity Treaty were substantially
the same under the Clinton Administration.' When the
U.S. representative to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright,
signed the Biodiversity Treaty on June 4, 1993,12 U.S.
officials appended an interpretive statement 123 addressing
the biotechnology industry's technology transfer and patent
protection concerns."M In this interpretive statement, the
118 Convention on Biological Diversity, S. Doc. No. 20, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 12 (1993) (emphasis added).
"' Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
120 BNA-Patent Protection, supra note 6 at 1072.
121 See Richard L. Berke, Clinton Declares New U.S. Policies for
Environment, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1993, at 1. (stating that President
Clinton expressed concerns similar to those of former President Bush over
certain provisions of the Biodiversity Treaty regarding the transfer of
biotechnology). President Clinton, however, unlike President Bush, signed
the Biodiversity Treaty once a compromise was reached between
biotechnology-pharmaceutical companies and environmental groups. See id.
12 See Stevens, supra note 9, at C4.
123 The Clinton Administration characterizes the interpretive statement
as a detailed report of the Clinton Administration's position on Articles 16(3)
and 19(2) of the Biodiversity Treaty. See Convention on Biological
Diversity, Letter of Submittal, supra note 118, at iv.
124 The interpretive statement also accompanied the Biodiversity Treaty
when the treaty was sent to the U.S. Senate for ratification. See Convention
on Biological Diversity, Letter of Submittal, supra note 118, at v-xix.
President Clinton's Letter of Submittal states, "The Administration will
therefore strongly resist any actions taken by Parties to the Convention that
lead to inadequate levels of protection of [patent] rights, and will continue
to pursue a vigorous policy with respect to ... adequate and effective
[patent] protection . . . ." Id. at iv.
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United States adopts the position that commercially viable
products will not make it to the market if patent protection is
not afforded companies that discover and develop new
biotechnology.
4.2. Developing Nations Under The Biodiversity Treaty
There are existing treaties that offer general patent
protection and other treaties that specifically protect
biotechnology patents. An example of a general patent
protection treaty is the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, which provides basic rights for patent
protection. 2 ' Additionally, the Patent Cooperation Treaty
outlines procedures that simplify international patent filing
requirements.'26  A treaty that specifically addresses
biotechnology patent protection is the Budapest Treaty, which
concerns international depositories that receive deposits of
organisms in order to fulfill patent application
requirements."2 7 Another such treaty is the International
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants,
which provides patent protection for breeders of new plant
128species.
The existing patent treaties, 2 9 combined with proposed
patent treaties under negotiation or revision,' s° demonstrate
that "the industrialized world is in the process of 'locking up'
patents for biotechnology and bioprocesses so that its position
in the coming decades will be unassailable.""' With the
exception of the Paris Convention, few, if any, developing
nations are parties to these treaties. 2 More significantly,
under the existing treaties, no benefits accrue to nations
supplying the raw materials for biotechnology.
Articles 16(3) and 19(2) of the Biodiversity Treaty do not
125 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883, 161 Consol. T.S. 409-417 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
126 Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645.
117 Budapest Treaty, supra note 77, at 1242.
128 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, 815 U.N.T.S. 89.
129 See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
130 See BNA-Patent Protection, supra note 6, at 1072.
131 See WIEGELE, supra note 19, at 105.
1" 2 Id at 87-89.
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provide for a mandatory means of sharing benefits with
developing countries, but specifically provide that contracting
parties should share the technology on mutually agreed upon
terms.'33 Although commentators initially interpreted these
provisions as mandating "compulsory licensing
arrangements" 3 " (in alleged contravention of proposed
patent provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade treaty),'3 5 the current position of the United States is
that articles 16(3) and 19(2) concern intellectual property
rights, not licensing arrangements. 3 '
Given the U.S. interpretation of articles 16(3) and 19(2),
developing nations are unlikely to receive patented
biotechnology under the Biodiversity Treaty. Under the U.S.
interpretation of article 16(3), voluntary transfer of technology
from private industry will not occur if a developing country is
without "effective" levels of patent protection and a legal
system which protects and enforces patent rights. 3 ' Since
few developing countries are signatories to the international
patent treaties, 3 8 it is unlikely that a developing nation will
be viewed as providing adequate and effective patent
protection sufficient to encourage "voluntary transfer of
technology."39 Even if a developing country is, or becomes,
a party to existing international patent treaties and develops
its domestic patent laws, it is still unlikely, under the U.S.
interpretation of article 19(2), that technology transfer will
occur. The United States has opted to leave to the sole
discretion of private industry the determination of when and
if it is appropriate for a developing country to participate in
133 See Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 118, at 13.
134 Richard Wilder, of the Association of Biotechnology Companies, takes
this position. See BNA-Patent Protection, supra note 6, at 1072. The
interpretive statement makes clear that the United States understands that
the Biodiversity Treaty does not advocate the use of compulsory licensing
laws that would require the U.S. government to "compel private companies
to transfer technology." See Convention on Biological Diversity, Letter of
Submittal, supra note 118, at xiii.
, See BNA-Patent Protection, supra note 6, at 1072.
136 See id. (citing a May 29, 1992 State Department press memorandum).
'a See Convention on Biological Diversity, Letter of Submittal, supra
note 118, at xii-xiii.
' See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
13 Convention on Biological Diversity, Letter of Submittal, supra note
118, at xii-xiii.
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the research and development of new products. Arguably, this
is contrary to the language of articles 16(3) and 19(2), which
requires signatories to legislate or administer with regard to
the transfer of and access to developed technologies. 40
Articles 16(3) and 19(2) may have been aimed at avoiding
situations such as the one that arose between th6 United
States's Eli Lilly & Co. and Madagascar. In Madagascar, folk
healers used a plant, the rosy periwinkle, for various
medicinal purposes. Eli Lilly discovered that cancer-fighting
drugs could be made from the plant. Eli Lilly set up farms in
Madagascar to grow additional plants, manufactured its
cancer-fighting drug, and subsequently made millions of
dollars, while Madagascar received nothing. 4 ' Under the
U.S. interpretation of articles 16(3) and 19(2), however,
countries like Madagascar are unlikely to receive their share
of the benefits and profits from such products. Thus, as it now
stands, the Biodiversity Treaty can merely encourage, but not
mandate, that biotechnology companies share the profits from
innovative and commercially successful products with the
developing countries that provide the raw materials for those
products."
Under the Clinton Administration, however, the U.S.
position regarding royalty payments apparently has changed.
The Administration agrees in principle that benefits should
accrue to developing nations for the use of their genetic
resources, and that such benefits can take the form of
"monetary compensation." 4 ' The Clinton Administration's
position appears to reflect a new willingness on the part of the
biotechnology industry to view articles 16(3) and 19(2) as
140 See Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 118, at 11, 13.
This language can be read as an unwillingness to leave to the free market
the task of arranging technology transfer and sharing of benefits.
141 See Third World Seeks Share of Biotech Profits, supra note 109, at
1830.
14 For an extensive examination of strategies that developing nations
can utilize to benefit from biotechnology products that use their
environmental resources, see David Dembo et al., Biotechnology and the
Third World: Some Social, Economic, Political and Legal Impacts and
Concerns, 11 RuTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 431 (1985). Dembo et al.
propose many strategies for developing nations to implement when
contracting with transnational corporations. Id. at 463-66.
143 See Convention on Biological Diversity, Letter of Submittal, supra
note 118, at vi.
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recommending royalty payments, rather than as requiring
technology transfers.
Biotechnology trade organizations, which no longer oppose,
in theory, the sharing of benefits and profits with developing
nations,"' currently advocate the use of agreements such as
the one between Merck Co." 5 and the National Institute of
Biodiversity of Costa Rica ("INBIO")." 6 Merck will pay $1
million to INBIO in return for access to the plants and other
organisms of Costa Rica; if a commercial product is
subsequently developed using these materials, Merck will pay
royalties to INBIO." 7  The Merck agreement clearly
indicates the direction in which a biotechnology company must
go in order to retain a competitive share of this market. It
remains to be seen, however, whether $1 million in royalty
payments will be perceived by the developing nations as an
adequate sharing of benefits if a commercially-successful
product generates, for example, over $100 million in profits.
In any event, widespread use of voluntary agreements may be
a long time in coming, and beneficial arrangements for both
industrialized and developing nations may effectively be
arrived at only through provisions such as those contained in
the Biodiversity Treaty.
4.3. Emerging U.S. Biotechnology Policy And Developing
Nations
Progress with respect to globalization and
commercialization will not alone ensure that the U.S.
biotechnology industry retains its competitive edge."' The
'"See BNA-Patent Protection, supra note 6, at 1072.
'"In 1989, Merck Company (U.S.) was the leader in pharmaceutical
sales, ranking number one among all multinational pharmaceutical
companies. See OTA-BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 1, at 85.
146 See BNA-Patent Protection, supra note 6, at 1072.
.47 See Lynn Shapiro, Plant Derived, 241 CHEMICAL MARKETING REP.,
Mar. 9, 1992, at SR38. Other similar agreements exist. For example,
Shaman Pharmaceutical, Inc., backed by Eli Lilly & Co., plans to
compensate people and countries who offer materials and assistance with a
portion of royalties and profits if a commercially viable drug is developed.
See Barnum, supra note 108, at C1.
'48 See OTA-BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 1, at 211-14; see
generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMMERCIAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 263-502 (1984) (detailing 10
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absence of a comprehensive U.S. biotechnology policy for the
development of the U.S. biotechnology industry'49 will result
in a decrease of U.S. competitiveness in the industry. The
U.S. government's aim should be the promotion of
biotechnology by "consider[ing] [its] future path... and [by]
anticipat[ing] any problems that technology might
present."'50 The emergence of a U.S. biotechnology policy is
suggested by the Clinton Administration's decision to draft an
interpretive statement of the Biodiversity Treaty.'5 ' The
U.S. government, however, must take further steps to aid the
biotechnology industry.
Existing U.S. patent laws are problematic for the
biotechnology industry.'52  Application of these laws to
biotechnology products and processes has led to inconsistent
results. Patent validity and infringement litigation, in
addition to being costly, can have other serious effects on small
biotechnology companies. The loss of a patent claim may
impede a company's ability to raise capital through public
markets, force mergers with larger companies that may
otherwise not have resulted,'53 or ultimately serve to
factors influencing competitiveness in biotechnology). These reports, while
focusing on the U.S. competitive edge in the commercialization and
globalization ofbiotechnology, are primarily concerned with patent problems
and maintaining this competitive edge. The developing nations that supply
raw materials to the biotechnology industry, and the role these raw
materials play in driving the biotechnology industry, are scarcely
mentioned, if at all.
149 See Gore, supra note 22, at 19; Senator Albert Gore, Jr. & Steve
Owens, The Challenge of Biotechnology, 3 YALE L. & PoLY REV. 336, 348
(1985).
,10 Gore & Owens, supra note 149, at 357.
... See Alex Barnum, Companies, Environmentalists United on Treaty,
S.F. CHRON., Apr. 24, 1993, at B1.
152 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
15 For example, American Home Products acquired its 60% stake in GI
after litigation in which GI's EPO drug was held to be an infringement of
Amgen, Inc.'s patent. See discussion supra § 3.2. Cetus' merger with Chiron
and the selling of its polymerase chain reaction technology to Hoffman-La
Roche came on the heels of a patent infringement suit with E.I. DuPont de
Nemours Co. regarding this technology. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.
v. Cetus Corp., No. C 89-2860 MHP, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18382, (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 11, 1990); Chynoweth, supra note 36, at 12. Eastman Kodak,
which had research and development agreements with Cetus for the
polymerase chain reaction technology, unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the
sale of the technology to Hoffman-La Roche. This also added to Cetus'
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decrease the incentives for start-ups in the biotechnology
industry. The absence of a clear U.S. biotechnology policy has
meant, in part, that the courts have been required to apply
patent laws that do not necessarily contemplate the particular
issues raised by biotechnology to biotechnology cases, a
phenomenon that may, over time, hinder the biotechnology
industry.
A comprehensive U.S. biotechnology policy should close
existing domestic and international patent law loopholes, such
as section 1337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (the Durden
Dilemma), the deposit requirement, and the experimental-use
provision of section 271(e)(1). The effect of these loopholes is
that the biotechnology industry is inadequately protected
against acts of patent infringement, which can result in a
company's unwillingness to share profits from a commercially
successful product with a developing nation that supplied the
raw materials for the product, if the possibility exists that
those profits will be consumed by subsequent costly patent
litigation.
The position of the United States in 1992 regarding the
Biodiversity Treaty may have reflected a lack of awareness of
the U.S. biotechnology industry's dependence on the organisms
supplied by developing nations. Perhaps the Bush
Administration was unaware that the developing nations had
recourse against the refusal of the U.S. biotechnology industry
to share benefits and profits, such as forming more
advantageous alliances with European nations and Japan. It
may be the case, with the first suggestion of an emerging U.S.
biotechnology policy, that the United States finally believes
"that developing countries will curtail or restrict access to the
United States and other world leaders in biotechnology unless
the developing nations foresee some direct benefits from
[permitting] such access." 54
A loss of U.S. competitiveness in the biotechnology industry
will not result from U.S. biotechnology companies sharing the
benefits and profits from patented products with developing
nations."' 5 A loss of U.S. competitiveness in this industry
litigation costs. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Cetus Corp., No. 12,249, 1991
Del. Ch. LEXIS 197, at *1-*3 (Dec. 3, 1991).
154 See Adler, supra note 111, at 474.
155 See generally WIEGELE, supra note 19, at 105-120 (outlining problems
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will result, however, from alliances between developing
nations and other industrialized nations, such as Europe and
Japan, which may be more willing to share the benefits of
biotechnology products with these developing nations.15
Europe's and Japan's access to the raw materials needed to
make biotechnology products, coupled with their recent
acquisitions of U.S. biotechnology knowledge and processes,
will undoubtedly place these countries in a position to become
leading manufacturers and exporters of biotechnology products
in the near future. 5 '
5. CONCLUSION
Both patent protection and raw materials are vital to the
U.S. biotechnology industry. The United States must adopt a
comprehensive biotechnology policy that recognizes both
factors if it is to reap the benefits of what promises to be one
of the next decade's most profitable industries. The United
States arguably has moved in this direction by appending an
interpretive statement to the Biodiversity Treaty. The United
States, however, must do more to aid the U.S. biotechnology
industry. A comprehensive U.S. biotechnology policy should
close loopholes in existing patent laws. Currently, these
loopholes create fears within the U.S. biotechnology industry
that prevent U.S. biotechnology companies from sharing the
benefits of, and profits from, innovative biotechnology products
with the developing nations that supply the raw materials for
these products. If the developing nations are not permitted to
share in the social and economic profits to be gained from U.S.
biotechnology products, they soon may refuse to supply U.S.
biotechnology companies with the raw materials necessary to
manufacture these products. Developing nations may be
with the developing nations' biotechnology).
' See generally, OTA-BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT, supra note 1, at 53-64
(describing foreign participation in biotechnology mergers and acquisitions,
as well as various strategic alliances used to raise finances).
167 For example, one commentator suggests that the nature of the
German and Japanese business and economic systems make these countries
more effective competitors in the biotechnology industry. Since government
and industry in these countries are so highly integrated, these nations will
be better able to develop and retain technology "that would otherwise spread
rapidly to trading rivals." Gavin Boyd, STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC COOPERATION 119 (1991).
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induced to supply raw materials instead to Europe and Japan,
which will lead to a loss of business for the U.S. biotechnology
industry and a subsequent loss of U.S. competitiveness in this
highly profitable, and expanding, industry.
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